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PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY
COOPERATION: LESSONS FROM THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE
Duncan B. Hollis* & Matthew C. Waxman**
ABSTRACT
Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in combating
cyber threats have generated mixed results, at best. In this paper, we examine the
architecture of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a possible model for
future cybersecurity cooperation among interested states. We identify several
features of PSI’s architecture (rather than its substantive focus on non-proliferation)
for further analysis, including PSI’s low entry costs, tiered structure, and flexibility,
as well as its leveraging of both territorial jurisdiction and state consent. We
conclude that, despite several hurdles visible in the scope of its membership and its
legal framework, PSI still offers worthwhile parallels to draw upon, suggesting a
new framework that could allow interested states to further cooperate in addressing
current cyber threats.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity threats have become ubiquitous. Today, cyber-attacks by state
and non-state actors—including disruption of infrastructure, large-scale theft of data
and intellectual property, hacking of political actors and election systems—are
generating significant losses. These losses, moreover, are occurring across a range
of metrics, including national security, privacy, and economics.
Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in combatting
these threats have generated mixed results, at best. For example, in 2013, a United
Nations Group of Governmental Experts (U.N. GGE), including experts from the
Chinese, Russian, and U.S. governments, adopted a consensus report indicating that
“[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable
and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure,
peaceful and accessible ICT [(information and communication technology)]
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environment.” 1 This view was confirmed by another U.N. GGE in 2015, which also
endorsed a series of voluntary (i.e., non-legally binding) norms for responsible state
behavior. 2 These included prohibiting states from peacetime targeting of critical
infrastructure and the work of computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs). 3
Unfortunately, much of the GGE’s momentum was lost in 2017 when the latest GGE
failed to generate any report. According to the U.S. expert at the negotiations,
[d]espite years of discussion and study, some participants . . . seem to want
to walk back progress made in previous GGE reports. I am coming to the
unfortunate conclusion that those who are unwilling to affirm the
applicability of these international legal rules and principles believe their
States are free to act in or through cyberspace to achieve their political
ends with no limits or constraints on their actions. 4
With the recent GGE’s failure, attention has shifted to other fora for cultivating
international cybersecurity rules. Some efforts—like the non-governmental Global
Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace—are focused on reaching new universal

The genesis for the essays that comprise issue 32.2 of this Journal was a May 2017 workshop hosted
at Temple University, and co-hosted with Leiden University. Under the theme “Influencing
International Behavior in Cyberspace: Devising a Playbook of Consequences for Cyber Incidents,”
the workshop gathered a broad array of academic and governmental experts. Participants included
representatives of the Estonian, Finnish, and U.S. governments (including officials from the
Department of Defense, the State Department, and the U.S. Trade Representative). All government
officials, however, participated in their personal capacity. As such, the views expressed in this
special issue should not be attributed to any government or government agency.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Temple University Beasley School
of Law; Non-Resident Scholar, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
** Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Co-Chair, Cybersecurity Center,
Columbia Data Science Institute; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.
1. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 GGE Report]. The GGE
process is, of course, not the only vehicle for inter-state cooperation on cybersecurity. In 2015, for
example, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping announced a “common understanding”
on cyberespionage. They agreed that neither the U.S. nor the Chinese government “will conduct or
knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other
confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to
companies or commercial sectors.” See OFFICE OF PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT XI
JINPING’S STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES (2015). This principle was later endorsed by the
G-20. See G-20 Leaders’ Communiqué, Antalya Summit, (Nov. 15–16, 2015), ¶ 26,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000111117.pdf. The Trump administration and the Xi Government
also recently reaffirmed the prohibition on cyber-espionage. Cory Bennett, Why Trump is Sticking
with Obama’s China Hacking Deal, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2017, 5:29 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/08/trump-obama-china-hacking-deal-244658.
2. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 GGE Report].
3. See id., ¶ 13(h), (k).
4. Michele Markoff, U.S. Expert to the Group of Governmental Experts, Explanation of
Position at the Conclusion of the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security (June 23, 2017), https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7880.
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agreements on substantive standards for state behavior. 5 Meanwhile, Microsoft
President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith has been promoting a “Digital Geneva
Convention,” which notably includes a call for global technology companies to
agree to a set of rules on cybersecurity. 6
Cooperation in cybersecurity, however, need not always involve devising new
norms, rules, interpretations or principles any more than it must involve all states. 7
Progress can come through the development of new processes among like-minded
groups of states and other stakeholders that seek to effectuate existing international
laws and other norms.
In this vein, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is often cited as a possible
model for future cybersecurity cooperation. 8 Some have already analyzed whether
the PSI’s approach to the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could
apply to cybersecurity. 9 In this essay, we offer a different analysis, examining the
architecture of PSI’s cooperative mechanisms (rather than its contents) as a possible
model for future cybersecurity cooperation among interested states. We conclude
that there are worthwhile parallels to draw upon, which could allow interested states
to further cooperate in addressing current cyber threats.
II. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
In December 2002, a North Korean freighter, the So San, was transiting the
Arabian Sea without flying a flag and with a newly painted hull that obscured its
name and home port. U.S. intelligence officials asked Spanish marines to board and

5. See, e.g., Global Commission Proposes Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet,
GLOB. COMM’N ON THE STABILITY OF
CYBERSPACE
(Nov.
21,
2017),
https://cyberstability.org/news/global-commission-proposes-action-to-increase-cyberspacestability/ (describing the GCSC Commissioners declaration urging state and non-state actors to
avoid activity that would intentionally and substantially damage the general availability or integrity
of the “public core” of the internet). For details on the composition and mission of the GCSC, see
GLOB. COMM’N ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE, https://cyberstability.org (last visited Feb.
17, 2018).
6. Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 14,
2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/. In
the interest of full disclosure, one of us—Duncan Hollis—is presently advising Microsoft on
international legal issues relating to its proposal.
7. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 425, 427, 465 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Testimony of Christopher Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S.
Department of State, Cybersecurity: Setting the Rules for Responsible State Behavior,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY,
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, S. HRG. 114-76, May 14, 2015, 21; Joseph Marks,
Report: DoD needs to improve cybersecurity, resilience – Cyber ripe for cooperation, GOP leaders
Jan.
22,
2015,
https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morningsay,
POLITICO,
cybersecurity/2015/01/report-dod-needs-to-improve-cybersecurity-resilience-cyber-ripe-forcooperation-gop-leaders-say-212543.
9. See, e.g., Trey Herr, Governing Proliferation in Cybersecurity, 3 GLOB. SUMMITRY 1
(2017).
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search the ship as a “stateless” vessel. 10 On board, they discovered fifteen Scud
missiles hidden under bags of cement. Efforts to seize these missiles, however, were
unavailing. 11 The Yemeni government informed U.S. and Spanish authorities that
they had purchased the missiles, and, in the absence of international law rules against
transporting such materials, those authorities allowed the delivery to proceed. 12 The
event was seen as evidence of both (i) how seriously many states take the
international law principle that “vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority
except that of the state whose flag they fly” 13 and (ii) serious gaps in states’
collective capability to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
their delivery systems, and related goods. 14
Within a year, the United States and Spain were among eleven founding
members of the PSI, a joint effort to strengthen the “political commitment, practical
capacities, and legal authorities necessary to stop, search, and, if necessary, seize
vessels and aircraft believed to be transporting ‘weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, and related materials.’” 15 PSI was not, however, a typical treatybased international institution. Rather, it came into existence by virtue of states
endorsing a political commitment, the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP). 16
A short document, the SIP identifies the proliferation of WMD as a common
threat, and pledges endorsing states to four sets of activities:
1. To “undertake effective measures” to interdict “the transfer or transport of
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and

10. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 110, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (authorizing a warship to board a foreign ship that appears to be without nationality).
When Spanish authorities tried to board the So San, its master claimed the vessel was Cambodian,
leading to a request to Cambodia that Spanish forces be allowed to board the vessel—permission
that Cambodia granted. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BRIEFING, PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE, FED NEWS SERVICE 12 (2003).
11. See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM.
J. INT’L L. 526, 526 (2004).
12. See Joel A. Doolin, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New
International Norm, 59 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 29, 30 (2005) (describing how international laws
enabled So San to transport Scud missiles); see also Byers, supra note 11, at 526; Thom Shanker,
Threats and Responses: Arms Smuggling; Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/11/world/threats-and-responses-armssmuggling-scud-missiles-found-on-ship-of-north-korea.html.
13. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 64 (Sept. 7).
14. See Byers, supra note 11, at 527 (“Traffickers can take advantage of flags of
convenience—registering their vessels in states that provide little in the way of regulation and
oversight—or use vessels flagged by states that steadfastly refuse to consent to the exercise of high
seas jurisdiction by others.”).
15. Id. at 528. Before the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP), the PSI idea was first
announced in a presidential press conference in Poland. See President George W. Bush, Former
President of the U.S., Remarks by the President to the People of Poland at Wawel Royal Castle in
Krakow
(May
31,
2003),
available
at
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html.
16. See AARON DUNNE, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL REALITIES SIPRI PAPER NO. 36 vii (Stockholm Int’l Peace
Res. Inst., 2013) (noting that the aims of PSI were to limit the delivery and transport of WMD).
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non-state actors of proliferation concern;” 17
2. To streamline procedures for “rapid exchange of relevant information
concerning suspected proliferation activity,” including protecting the
confidentiality of shared information and dedicating “appropriate
resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities;” 18
3. To strengthen “relevant national legal authorities” and “relevant
international law and frameworks” to accomplish the PSI’s objectives; 19
and
4. To prevent the transport of covered materials where there is a reasonable
suspicion that a vessel or aircraft is carrying them, including boarding and
searching vessels flying the endorsing state’s flag (or consenting to other
states doing so); requiring aircraft to land for inspection; and inspecting
vessels at transshipment points within its jurisdiction; and seizing covered
goods. 20
The SIP directs that all PSI activities should occur only to the extent consistent with
an endorsing state’s national laws and its obligations under international law. 21
Other states were invited to join the PSI, and as of today, 105 states have
endorsed the SIP. 22 Participation is subdivided between a core group of twenty-one
states comprising the “Operational Experts Group” which has the greatest capacity
to undertake counter-proliferation activities, and other endorsing states. 23 For those
states looking to build capacity, the PSI has produced a Model National Response
Plan. 24
At its core, PSI references a set of activities rather than establishing an
institution. 25 To date, it is credited with dozens of interdictions of WMD-related
17. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: STATEMENT OF
INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, at princ. 1 (2003), https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (defining
“[s]tates or non-state actors of proliferation concern” as those involved in “(1) efforts to develop or
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers
(either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials”).
18. Id. at princ. 2.
19. Id. at princ. 3.
20. Id. at princ. 4 (offering an illustrative list of six activities participating states could take
in “support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related
materials to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations
under international law and frameworks . . .”).
21. Id. at pmbl., princ. 4.
SECURITY
INITIATIVE,
22. PSI
Endorsing
States,
PROLIFERATION
http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/03-endorsing-states/0-PSI-endorsing-states.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). A good discussion of this wide invitation
can be found in SUSAN J. KOCH, OCCASIONAL PAPER 9: PROLIFERATION
SECURITY
INITIATIVE:
ORIGINS
AND
EVOLUTION
19–20
(2012),
http://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Occasional%20Papers/09_Prolifera
tion%20Security%20Initiative.pdf.
23. DUNNE, supra note 16, at vii, 6. The Operational Experts Group is further divided into
specific regional groupings. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 43.
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materials. 26 This success comes even as—or perhaps because—the PSI is loosely
organized. It pushes states to develop and exercise jointly the necessary domestic
legal tools to deal with WMD proliferation. But it also leaves states to decide for
themselves who are “states and non-state actors of proliferation concern” 27 and what
constitutes “reasonable suspicion.” 28 This gives participating states considerable
latitude to interpret what behavior conforms to PSI and whether to label an
interdiction as PSI-related. 29
Originally, PSI was controversial because of perceptions that its participants
were seeking to change the international legal rules relating to the freedom of the
high seas. 30 In practice, however, most PSI activities occur within a participating
state’s territory or with the permission of the flag state or the aircraft’s state of
registration. 31 In other words, PSI’s primary impacts have occurred within domestic
legal frameworks wherein states deploy their own resources (or consent to others
doing so) in ways consistent with the SIP’s broadly stated goals. The result is a
system of cooperation that is not so much collective as it is coordinated.
That said, the PSI has not ignored international law entirely. Bilaterally, the
United States has entered into at least eleven “ship-boarding” treaties where the
parties give advance consent to the other sides’ search of any of its flagged vessels
suspected of WMD trafficking, thereby paving the way for PSI operations. 32 PSI
participants have also called for more widespread participation in the Protocol to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention) and greater implementation of various U.N. Security
Council Resolutions on WMD proliferation (particularly those relating to North
Korea and Iran). 33 In that regard, PSI has helped make existing international law
work more effectively. At the same time, participants have not sought to modify the
26. Emma Belcher, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., The Proliferation Security
Initiative:
Lessons
for
Using
Nonbinding
Agreements
1
(2011),
https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper6_PSI.pdf; see also
Herr, supra note 9, at 16 (describing PSI as “moderately successful”).
27. STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at princ. 1.
28. Id. at pmbl. (The source text uses “reasonably suspected” when discussing what we have
termed as “reasonable suspicion” here.)
29. See DUNNE, supra note 16, at 10 (noting the lack of formal methods for determining
whether certain activities constitute a PSI interdiction).
30. See generally Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation,
Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 507 (2005).
31. See DUNNE, supra note 16, at 35 (noting that, despite the So San incident serving as the
PSI catalyst, interdictions in international waters are “extremely rare”).
32. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea,
Cyprus-U.S.,
July
25,
2005,
Department
of
State
Press
Releases,
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50274.htm.
33. See, e.g., Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2015);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar.
10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons
program and non-cooperation with prior U.N. resolutions); S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 3 (Apr. 24, 2004)
(requiring all states to “establish domestic controls to prevent” WMD proliferation).
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basic international maritime law framework.
In sum, the PSI offers an innovative approach to cooperation by a “coalition of
the willing” against a global threat via loose coordination of national and
international toolsets. As such, it might serve as a model for addressing issues of
global cybersecurity. 34 We believe that there are good reasons for the comparison.
Specifically, there are several key aspects of the PSI that appear well-suited to one
or more cybersecurity problems.
III. POSITIVE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE FEATURES FOR GLOBAL
CYBERSECURITY
Ultimately, the real value of PSI as a possible model for global cybersecurity
lies not in the specific activities that it asks participating states to endorse, but the
institutional architecture by which it does so. 35 In other words, we are not arguing
for a policy of more aggressive interdiction or counter-proliferation of dangerous
cyber tools; rather, we are looking to WMD interdiction for lessons on cultivating
international cooperation for a gamut of cybersecurity challenges. For example, as
states seek to build consensus around appropriate responses to unlawful cyber
behavior—or behavior in violation of norms promoted by bodies like the U.N.
GGE—a PSI architecture provides a potentially novel way to encourage collective
action without necessitating legally binding commitments or changes to extant laws
and norms.
We briefly summarize below eight ways in which a PSI-like approach might
be attractive to states for addressing some cybersecurity issues: (i) orientation, (ii)
low entry costs, (iii) tiered structure, (iv) leveraging territorial jurisdiction, (v)
leveraging state consent, (vi) flexibility, (vii) processes of evolution, and (viii)
experimentation. At the same time, we also note two challenges that need attention
before pursuing a PSI framework for dealing with cyber threats: issues of hegemony
and differing background legal frameworks. On balance, we conclude that the PSI
architecture offers a potential model for coordinating international cooperation, not
to halt trade in malicious cyber tools, but rather to coordinate state responses to
unwanted cyber behavior.
A. Potential Benefits of a PSI Approach
As a model for promoting international cooperation and developing stronger
international rules for cybersecurity, PSI has many attractive or instructive features,
including the following.

34. See Herr, supra note 9, at 5 (“Developed to interdict the spread of WMD devices, as noted
above, the PSI has occupied a central role in the discussion over proper analogies for cybersecurity
and proliferation, most prominently through informal proposals by some in the U.S. State
Department.”).
35. Thus, we should not be read to endorse an exclusively “proliferation” focused model for
dealing with cybersecurity. Nor do we mean to suggest that cybersecurity itself is a single problem
set that warrants a unitary solution; it involves a diverse set of problems such that we believe one
or more of them might benefit from a framework modeled off the PSI experiences to date.
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1. Orientation
PSI endorsing States share a common cause in combating WMD participation
and view PSI as complementary to other existing responses. A PSI-like approach to
cybersecurity could adopt a similar framework, using the affiliation to delineate
commonly held norms among a group of like-minded states and offering the
framework as complementing—rather than competing with—other existing
responses.
2. Low Entry Costs
As a coalition of the willing, PSI assumes cooperation can begin with a political
commitment by just a few states. A similar commitment for cybersecurity would
also not require onerous domestic approval processes associated with formal
international legal institutions or instruments. And by framing the scope of activities
to accord with extant domestic and international legal authorities and capacities,
such a framework would take states as it finds them. At a time when global
coalitions face division and dissension, there may be some appeal for allowing a
like-minded group of states to set out a coordination framework against one or more
types of cyber threats.
3. Tiered Structure
The PSI accepted that some states have the resources and tactical skills to deal
with proliferation while others did not, adopting a framework to accommodate this
disparate capacity. One could envision a similar division in cybersecurity where
some states have a much greater capacity to identify and respond to cybersecurity
threats on which others may depend, with assurances that doing so would not violate
national or international legal regimes.
4. Leveraging Territorial Jurisdiction
One of the PSI’s great strengths is recognizing how much extant international
maritime law defers to national authorities and the exercise of a state’s jurisdiction
within its territory, ports, and internal waters. If states build up their domestic
capacities to counter cyber threats, the PSI experience suggests that there can be
systemic benefits. Leaving states to act autonomously but according to a collective
framework may leave some relatively ungoverned spaces, but if national behaviors
reflect a sufficiently uniform and general practice it could substantially restrict the
ability of hostile actors to operate effectively. And while there was a time when
many questioned the ability of territorial jurisdiction to operate vis-à-vis cyberspace,
in recent years many states have demonstrated strong interest and sufficient capacity
to regulate cybersecurity on territorial grounds. 36 Thus, the first line of defense for
responding to global cyber threats may lie in coordinating better domestic authorities
and responsive operations.

36. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).
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5. Leveraging State Consent
With few exceptions, international law defers to state consent to delimit lawful
from unlawful behavior. 37 Thus, where a state consents to another PSI participating
state’s activities on its vessels or in its territorial seas, there are far fewer legal issues
than where such consent is absent. Likewise, cybersecurity might benefit from a
similar push for a state’s consent (whether formalized in advance or on an ad hoc
basis) to other participating state’s defensive operations in its networks or systems.
This would take the coordination contemplated by the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime 38 and elevate it to an even more integrated response. We might imagine,
for example, some number of states agreeing that one state could conduct network
investigative techniques against actors who are the source of cyber threats and
operating in the territory of another participating state.
6. Flexibility in Defining and Enforcing Norms
The PSI has allowed states to align around a core suite of activities while
acknowledging and accommodating different national approaches, as well as
different interpretations of international law (or desires for the evolution of
international law to accommodate proliferation-related restrictions on freedom of
navigation on the high seas). 39 Although these ambiguities have led some to criticize
PSI as being too malleable, this flexibility in coordinating around general norms
rather than precise ones may be attractive to states suspicious or wary of being
locked in to specific actions (or inactions). A PSI approach could take existing norms
(e.g., not targeting critical infrastructure in peacetime, not using CSIRTs for
malicious purposes) and leave to individual participants the precise contours by
which they understand what the norms mean. Further precision could come over
time as parties respond to different sorts of behavior, although there is a risk that the
iterations might go the other way and lead to a norm’s failure. 40
7. Process of Evolution
The PSI is a “voluntary” affiliation that was able to take advantage of the
participation of key actors and grow from less than a dozen states to more than one
hundred today. A similar strategy could be employed in developing a schedule of
consequences for unwanted cyber behavior. As PSI shows, there is no need to obtain
the consent of all the major players at once; but rather, a few key gatekeepers can
start the process, even in the face of significant opposition. (It is worth recalling that
a number of states, such as India and China, have publicly opposed PSI.) A major
design question from the outset is how easy or hard it would be to make such an
37. States cannot, however, consent to jus cogens violations such as genocide, unlawful use
of force, or torture.
38. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 23, 2001),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680081561.
39. See KOCH, supra note 22, at 13, 26–27 (discussing diplomatic and collaborative efforts
made by PSI states).
40. See Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 7, at 467 (noting that with respect to norm promotion
efforts, “[f]ailure remains an option (and may even be the dominant outcome)”).
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initiative to join, balancing wider participation with less precise or onerous
expectations of cooperation or consent.
8. Experimentation
Understanding that a PSI-like cybersecurity experiment could evolve over time
leaves room for the participating states to experiment with different shared activities.
In the PSI context, for example, states’ initial focus on international maritime
interdiction gave way to more productive—and more easily legitimated—port-state
efforts to deal with the transport and trans-shipment of WMD-related materials. A
similar dynamic approach in cybersecurity could accommodate the reality that some
efforts may fail and others may emerge where cooperation might be most productive.
B. Challenges in Applying PSI
In endorsing further analysis of the PSI model for cybersecurity, we are aware
that the analogy is not perfect. The PSI also has at least two problematic features
that may limit its effectiveness in promoting cybersecurity cooperation: (i)
representation; and (ii) varying legal frameworks.
1. Hegemonic and Underrepresented
PSI has been criticized for being a tool of U.S. hegemony with key parts of the
world (e.g., the Middle East and Africa) under-represented, despite those very areas
being at the highest risk for WMD proliferation. A U.S.-led effort in cybersecurity
could face similar charges. Indeed, there is the possibility that if the United States
and a like-minded coalition pursued a PSI-like framework for cybersecurity, a
competing coalition might be formed by “internet sovereignty” states such as China.
The result would be two or more rival coalitions looking to actively undermine each
other.
2. Different Background Legal Frameworks
Despite U.S. frustration with Yemen getting its Scud missiles in the So San
incident, there was remarkable unanimity about both the underlying unlawfulness of
proliferation and what interdictions international law allows and those it prohibits
(i.e., those of a vessel on the high seas without its flag state’s consent). 41 That
certainty gave the PSI room to work around the law’s limitations (e.g., by
negotiating ship-boarding agreements), and to focus on non-controversial
interdictions (i.e., by a port state, the flag state, or with the permission of a flag state
or the state of an aircraft’s registration). For cyberspace, however, how international
law applies is currently much less clear. Efforts like the Tallinn Manual (both the
original and 2.0 versions) may be celebrated for highlighting the extent to which

41. See, e.g., DUNNE, supra note 166, at 26–27 (noting how implementation of the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) “provide much of the national legal
basis required for undertaking the actions contained within the SIP” because they “ban or control
the possession (with some exceptions) and trade in WMD, their means of delivery and dual-use
goods”).
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various international law prohibitions and requirements apply in cyberspace. 42 Yet,
a close reading of the text of both editions evidences extensive and substantial
interpretative disagreements even among its Independent Group of Expert authors
(e.g., on defining an armed attack under the jus ad bellum). 43 Moreover, outside the
Tallinn process, others have questioned the very existence in cyberspace of some of
the international law rules identified in the Tallinn Manual (e.g., self-defense,
sovereignty, due diligence). 44 In such circumstances, where there is little agreement
on the boundaries of permissible or impermissible behavior, it necessarily
complicates efforts to respond to conduct which some group of states considers
wrongful. Other states may contest not only the consequences brought to bear, but
also the idea that the original behavior even deserved a sanction in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROMISING MODEL
On balance, PSI offers a governance model that could be fruitful in addressing
cybersecurity issues in the current environment. Like proliferation issues,
cybersecurity cooperation could benefit from an orientation that accepts the reality
of persistent threats and seeks to mitigate or remediate them. With the failure of the
2017 U.N. GGE, moreover, prospects for further universal, global efforts appear to
be on hiatus. As such, plurilateral projects are currently a more viable alternative for
cooperation. Like-minded states could, for example, coalesce cooperation around
the enforcement of specific, agreed-upon norms of behavior, such as those
articulated by the U.N. GGE in 2015 (e.g., protecting critical infrastructure from
malicious cyber threats, assisting others whose critical infrastructure is threatened,
sharing information, responsibly reporting vulnerabilities, and assisting the victims
of the most severe cyber threats). 45 State capacity to conform to these norms is, of
course, highly varied. But, that is precisely where a PSI-like tiered structure could
prove useful as those with capacity take action, including with the consent of other
42. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (NATO CCD COE, 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN 2.0];
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (NATO CCD COE, 2013). Although funded by NATO’s Cyber Defense Centre
of Excellence, both manuals represent the work of an independent group of experts.
43. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 2, at 341 (“[T]he law is unclear as to the precise point at which
the effects of a cyber operation qualify that operation as an armed attack.”).
44. States like China and Cuba resist the idea that armed attacks can occur in cyberspace
sufficient to trigger the right of self-defense. JULIAN KU, HOW CHINA’S VIEWS ON THE LAW JUS
AD BELLUM WILL SHAPE ITS LEGAL APPROACH TO CYBERWAREFARE, AEGIS PAPER NO. 1701, at
2 (2017), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ku_webreadypdf.pdf; Arun M.
Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed as Well?, LAWFARE
(July 14, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspacedoomed-well; see also Colonel Gary Corn, Tallinn Manual 2.0—Advancing the Conversation, JUST
SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancingconversation/ (Writing in a personal capacity, the current legal adviser to U.S. Cyber Command
questions whether sovereignty is clearly a rule of international law as opposed to a background
principle that informs the meaning of other rules (e.g., non-intervention), while also noting that
“[l]ike sovereignty, the applicability and scope of the due diligence rule to cyberspace is hardly a
settled issue.”).
45. 2015 GGE Report, supra note 2, ¶13.
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participating states where necessary. Focusing operations within participating state
territories and employing consent to such operations could, moreover, go a long way
to ensuring a project, like PSI, works within the bounds of existing national and
international legal authorities.
Ultimately, a PSI-like model for cybersecurity recognizes that the current
dynamic environment requires flexibility with the idea that the most effective
measures can evolve, over time, into best practices for global cybersecurity
cooperation. For now, it is enough to suggest that a like-minded, voluntary group of
states acting autonomously but cooperatively could improve on the status quo. In the
critical infrastructure context, for example, a PSI-like model could avoid the
problem of defining what constitutes “critical infrastructure,” focusing instead on
identifying a set of common practices (e.g., information sharing, capacity building,
mutual legal assistance, domestic law enforcement actions, etc.) designed to protect
whatever infrastructure each state views as critical.
Our point is not, however, to argue for or against particular cooperative
mechanisms. Our aim is more modest—to emphasize how the architecture in which
any cybersecurity cooperation efforts rest matters. And to the extent there are
obvious roadblocks, it makes sense for any PSI-like model to accommodate these
rather than run into them. For example, to avoid charges of hegemony, cybersecurity
cooperation should take advantage of distributed capacities to ensure that those with
the capacity provide technical assistance and other capacity-building measures (e.g.,
information sharing or technical training) to encourage participation by less capable
states. Such exchanges would not, however, be necessarily one-sided. States with
less capacity can still add their voice to operations by the more skilled subset of
participating states, whether to endorse efforts to halt or take down sources of
malicious cyber activity elsewhere or to consent to doing so in their own territories.
The broader the coalition standing behind the actions of capable states, the greater
the potential impact is upon other states weighing whether to engage in malicious
behavior.
Similarly, differences over how international laws apply to cyberspace caution
against building a PSI-like model for cybersecurity that focuses on enforcing such
laws, at least until such time when states agree more precisely on what the law is or
what it means. Instead, cooperation could focus on improving cybersecurity by
coordinating around national legal authorities within participating state territories.
Certainly, such an approach would not do much to deal with safe havens in nonparticipating states, just as PSI leaves open possibilities of proliferation in nonparticipating territories. Yet, by seeking to silo off particular areas and coordinate
acceptable bounds of behavior within those areas, cybersecurity conditions may
improve even with the continued risk of threats from outside participating state
territories.
The time is ripe for new approaches to cybersecurity cooperation. We believe
the PSI deserves further consideration as a candidate for the architecture of such
activities. And we say “a” candidate deliberately. We should not be interpreted to
suggest that a PSI-like approach is the only—or even the best—solution going
forward. The economic, privacy, and national-security implications of the manifold
suite of cyber threats counsel for a multi-pronged response. Still, we believe that the
PSI should be considered as one of several processes that can help restore trust in
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the ICT environment and ensure a future where cyberspace is more open, stable, and
secure.

